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I. INTRODUCTION 
With roots in France, the minuet dance dominated the ballrooms 
of Louis XIV and spread throughout Europe and beyond. A social 
baroque dance, the minuet sees the two partners dancing separately in 
plain steps forward, backward, and sideways, while gradually and 
gracefully coming close to one another. Eventually, the pair come to 
hold hands, briefly continuing their dance together until separated again 
by their own movement. Throughout the entire dance, the two partners 
repeatedly come close, only to separate from one another. A similar 
movement can be observed between the U.S. and the EU in the 
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interaction of copyright laws and human rights1—the two jurisdictions 
continuously come close to one another, walking similar paths, then 
separate, spinning off in their own direction, only to then reunite for a 
few more steps in harmony. 
Similar to the graceful forward, backward and sideways movements 
in a minuet,2 the dynamics between intellectual property (IP) and 
human rights have intensified to the extent that human rights law is now 
characterized as IP’s new frontier.3 More specifically, when balancing 
various interests at stake in both the United States and the European 
Union, copyright laws engage internal as well as external mechanisms. 
Interestingly, the application of these tools takes place not only within 
the legislative powers of the two jurisdictions but, most prominently, 
within the judiciary. In this respect, the jurisprudence of the United 
States and the European Union have often harmoniously intertwined in 
an elegant move towards one another, before gradually swirling away 
into disparate interpretations. 
That said, the European Union and the United States bear a 
relative degree of similarity as far as their general frameworks are 
concerned. In the European Union, the external safeguards are defined 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the 
Charter),4 while the First Amendment5 to the U.S. Constitution serves 
that role across the Atlantic. A parallel can also be drawn from the 
internal safeguards of each jurisdiction. Main tools in this realm are the 
idea-expression dichotomy—applicable equally in both jurisdictions—
and certain permitted uses,6 such as fair use in the U.S. Copyright Act 
of 19767 and limitations and exceptions enshrined in Article 5 of 
Directive 2001/29/EC in the EU8 
Such mirroring legislative structures imply that the United States 
and the EU theoretically do not stand too far from one another when it 
comes to the intersection of copyright and fundamental rights. Indeed, 
                                                           
1 In this work, “copyright/human rights” and “copyright/fundamental rights” interaction 
will be used interchangeably when the discussion pertains to both the U.S. and EU 
jurisdictions. When the purview is on the United States, the former term will be used; 
when the EU is concerned, the latter will be employed. 
2 Laurence R. Helfer, Mapping the Interface Between Human Rights and Intellectual 
Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 6–15, 9 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015). 
3 Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the 
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INTL L.J. 1, 1 (2008). 
4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
6 This work uses the term “permitted uses” to collectively refer to the exceptions and 
limitations regime in the fair use doctrines of the EU and the United States. 
7 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
8 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]. 
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when tracing the leading jurisprudence in both territories, one observes 
that the two jurisdictions start from similar steppingstones. Despite this 
common background, the copyright and fundamental rights intersection 
somehow takes different interpretative routes and balancing exercises 
that involve diverging methodologies. While for a certain period of time, 
it seemed as though the EU had not entirely shut the door to external 
balancing,9 the United States appeared willing to foreclose external 
balancing after the landmark ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft in 2003.10 
Nonetheless, the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU) suggests that internal balancing based on permitted 
uses and the idea-expression dichotomy is well-suited to address 
conflicts based on the copyright and fundamental rights intersection.11 
Eventually, the EU and the United States have apparently gradually 
reunited in their affirmation that the copyright legislative framework is 
self-sufficient to internalize the conflict. 
The overall purpose of this article is to analyze the extent to which 
the approach in the EU differs from that in the United States. To do so, 
we first look at the essence of the internal and external safeguards (Part 
II). We then turn our focus to the leading case law in the United States 
and compare it to the CJEU’s practice. In this respect, we seek to verify 
whether and to what extent the decision-making process in the two 
jurisdictions has converged or diverged over the years (Part III). In the 
final part, we conclude by suggesting that, at the moment, it seems that 
the two systems are dancing side-by-side in the same direction. 
II. THE ESSENCE OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SAFEGUARDS 
All coherent copyright legislations aim to establish an internal 
equilibrium between the interests of the rightsholders and the public. In 
this respect, copyright legislation regularly refers to the need to maintain 
a fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories of 
                                                           
9 See Case C-484/14, McFadden v. Sony Music Entm’t Ger. GmbH (Sept. 15, 2016), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=183363&doclang=en; Case 
C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=119512&doclang=en; Case 
C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959; Case C-275/06, 
Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271. 
10 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
11 Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=216552&doclang=en; Case 
C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck (July 29, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=216543&doclang=en; Case 
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rightsholders, the public, and users of protected subject matter.12 In 
other words, copyright laws grant rightsholders exclusive rights while 
providing internal mechanisms to sufficiently balance and protect the 
interests of the public and users of copyright protected works. 
Ostensibly, copyright could be considered an island of exclusivity in a 
sea of freedom, in line with the idea that intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) are “islands of protection in a sea of competition.”13 
One such internal mechanism is the idea-expression dichotomy, 
according to which, ideas roam free and copyright protects only the 
original expression of such ideas.14 The dichotomy is a significant tool 
in preserving the balance of copyright and fundamental rights within the 
copyright law system.15 The essence of the idea-expression dichotomy is 
that rightsholders have only a limited capacity to control the expression 
of their ideas and cannot restrain the use of the underlying ideas 
themselves.16 This supports the grander theme that ideas enrich the 
public domain, which, in turn, is the milieu that nurtures creativity.17 
Nonetheless, the idea-expression dichotomy acquires a different 
flavor in common law versus civil law jurisdictions. This is rooted in the 
difference in theories that rationalize the existence of copyright in the 
first place.18 For instance, viewed from a utilitarian perspective, 
restricting copyright protection to the sole expression of ideas has a two-
fold objective. On the one hand, the dichotomy ensures free access to 
knowledge such as methods, systems, facts, utilitarian objects, titles, 
                                                           
12 InfoSoc Directive, supra note 8, at recital 31; Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC & 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 
130) 92, recital 6, art. 18(2). 
13 See Jerome H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: 
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 517 (1995); Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal 
Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1748 
n.17 (2000); Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of 
Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 268, 268 
(2004). 
14 MICHEL VIVANT & JEAN-MICHEL BRUGUIÈRE, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROITS VOISINS 
151 (4th ed. 2019). 
15 Abraham Drassinower, Exceptions Properly So-Called, in LANGUAGE AND 
COPYRIGHT 205, 230–31 (Ysolde Gendreau & Abraham Drassinower eds., 2009). 
16 Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 VA. L. REV. 1229, 
1247 (2016); Neil Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment; What Eldred Misses—
and Portends, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
ANALYSES 127 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005) (criticizing the 
adequacy of internal safeguards with specific reference to the idea-expression dichotomy 
and the fair use doctrine). 
17 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 969 (1990). 
18 Maurizio Borghi, Owning Form, Sharing Content: Natural-Right Copyright and Digital 
Environment, in 5 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 197 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 
2007). 
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themes, plots, scène à faire, styles or—as Professor Litman describes it—
a “hodgepodge of unprotectable subject matter.”19 This, in turn, enables 
progress since raw material is always available to everyone to build upon. 
On the other hand, the idea-expression dichotomy is a fundamental tool 
in striking the balance between copyright and free speech and, more 
generally, is a constitutive element of any utilitarian copyright rationale.20 
The dichotomy sometimes encroaches upon freedom of speech “in that 
it abridges the right to reproduce the ‘expression’ of others” in favor of 
the “greater public good in the copyright encouragement of creative 
works.”21  Other times, instead, it “encroaches upon the author’s right 
to control his works in that it renders his ‘ideas’ per se unprotectible, 
but this is justified by the greater public need for free access to ideas as 
part of the democratic dialogue.”22 
On the other end, the dichotomy also plays a role in personality 
rights theory, which sees copyright works as expressions of the 
individuality or the personality of the author, thereby belonging by 
nature to them. Authors can decide whether, in which form, and to what 
extent to communicate their works to other people. By sharing works 
with others through talking in public or publishing, authors’ ideas 
become known to third parties. These third parties, in turn, make 
permitted uses of the shared work, draw inspiration from them, and 
even judge and criticize them. In this context, the idea-expression 
dichotomy defines the boundaries between the author’s property and 
the public’s ownership.23 
Another widely utilized internal set of tools are  “permitted uses,” 
also referred to as “exceptions and limitations” in the EU24 and “fair use” 
in the United States.25 Bearing their own peculiarities, these statutorily 
permitted uses are crucial in delineating the scope of copyright 
protection. Nonetheless, it has been widely accepted that the fair use 
doctrine is much more flexible than the regime of exceptions and 
limitations dominating the EU copyright framework.26 Thanks to such 
                                                           
19 Litman, supra note 17, at 993. 
20 See Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy Legacy of Baker v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REV. 604, 609 
(1998) (“The idea-expression dichotomy has been characterized as a ‘hallowed principle 
of copyright law’ and Professor Nimmer labelled it an ‘axiom of copyright law’ which 
advanced a First Amendment value of limiting copyright protection in a manner 
consistent with free expression.”).  
21 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of 
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192 (1970). 
22 Id. 
23 Borghi, supra note 18, at 9 (“[A] shared work becomes ‘property of mankind’ and 
acquires the status of a ‘twofold belonging’ (author on one side, mankind on the 
other).”). 
24 InfoSoc Directive, supra note 8. 
25 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
26 See Jonathan Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece—The Liberation of European 
Copyright Law?, 1 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 87, 90 (2010); Tito 
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flexibility, the fair use doctrine has maintained the balance between free 
speech and exclusive intellectual property rights in the form of copyright 
while also allowing copyright law to adapt to technological 
developments.27 The doctrine has permitted the U.S. judiciary to 
employ a flexible approach in determining the application of copyright 
in response to social and technological changes.28 
That said, these two instruments are not the only internal tools 
maintaining the balance between copyright law and fundamental rights. 
The “tool-box of copyright”29 comprises further means of balancing—
namely, the notion of a work of authorship that features the requirement 
of originality; the scope of economic rights, such as the right of 
reproduction and the right of communication to the public; the doctrine 
of exhaustion (known as “the first-sale doctrine” in the United States); 
and the limited term of protection, among others. 
Outside of the copyright bubble, additional external safeguards 
strive to maintain the equilibrium of copyright and fundamental rights. 
These mechanisms are found in other branches of the law, such as 
competition law—where compulsory licenses are usually imposed30—and 
bills of rights (or “laws on fundamental rights and freedoms” in the EU). 
In relation to the latter, the most prominent instruments are the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the EU. 
Notably, however, the internal and external mechanisms of 
copyright regimes do not correspond strictly to two separate realms even 
though it may seem so at first sight. In principle, it may appear that the 
need to resort to an external balance arises when the internal 
safeguards—here, the idea-expression dichotomy and permitted uses—
do not adequately carry out the balancing exercise between 
rightsholders and the public. Along this line, a conflict between 
instances grounded in copyright law would require the application of 
internal safeguards, while a conflict rooted in different grounds—such as 
copyright exclusive rights, on the one hand, and the freedom of 
                                                           
Rendas, Destereotyping the Copyright Wars: The “Fair Use vs Closed List” Debate in 
the EU, SSRN ELECTRONIC J. 1, 8 (Sept. 8, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657482 [https://perma.cc/
MP3S-R6YH]; Guido Westkamp, The “Three-Step Test” and Copyright Limitations 
in Europe: European Copyright Law Between Approximation and National Decision 
Making, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 65 (2008). 
27 See Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 
1609 (2009).  
28 Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use 
Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 381, 419 (2005). 
29 P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT, AMSTERDAM L. SCH. 
LEG. STUD. RES. PAP. 11–12 (2008). 
30 Id. at 12. 
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expression of copyright users of copyright material, on the other—would 
necessitate the interaction of copyright legislation and human rights 
norms. 
Even though “the inside/outside location metaphor” may be 
perceived as a distinction between the kinds of considerations required 
to resolve a given dispute,31 the case law in both the United States and 
the EU demonstrates that fundamental rights considerations actually 
fuel the internal safeguards and that such a distinction is extremely 
blurred in practice.32 The reason is that many of the so-called external 
safeguards are already internalized in the copyright system through, for 
example, permitted uses. This is certainly the case with limitations for 
purposes such as news reporting, criticism, and parody, which, in the 
fundamental rights arena, protect the freedom of expression and 
information.33 In some of these cases, however, there may still be room 
for a balancing exercise between different rights and interests even if the 
external aspect of the dispute is already internalized through the 
adoption of an exception.34 In other words, while exceptions aimed at 
safeguarding the fundamental rights of information users35 may be, at 
first sight, considered internal safeguards—since they are encompassed 
within copyright statutes—in reality, they are much more. As Professor 
Drassinower points out, they can be considered “invitations to apply the 
structure of proportionality to mediate claims arising in distinct legal 
regimes.”36 
A typical instance where such internal balancing tools may fall short 
of internalizing instances grounded in fundamental rights is when new 
ways of expressing creativity arise or new technologies enable access to 
creative works in ways not known before.37 One such case, related to 
digital sound sampling, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, was recently the 
center of the CJEU’s attention.38 In Pelham, the clash between copyright 
law and the fundamental right of freedom of the arts became evident. 
As such, the issue was whether the conflict between copyright and 
                                                           
31 Drassinower, supra note 15, at 230. 
32 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018); Case C‑469/17, Funke Medien 
NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para. 60 (July 29, 2019),  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? docid=216545&doclang=en. 
33 P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, FIERCE CREATURES—COPYRIGHT EXEMPTIONS: TOWARDS 
EXTINCTION? 11 (1997), https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/PBH-
FierceCreatures.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYF2-NQGV]. 
34 Drassinower, supra note 15, at 222 (conceptualizing exceptions properly called “the 
nexus of an encounter between copyright and other juridical interests”). 
35 HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 29. 
36 Drassinower, supra note 15, at 222. 
37 Maria Lillà Montagnani, A New Interface Between Copyright Law and Technology: 
How User-Generated Content Will Shape the Future of Online Distribution, 26 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 719, 755 (2009). 
38 Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, para. 16 (Dec. 12, 2018), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=208881&doclang=en. 
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fundamental rights should be pushed outside the boundaries of the 
copyright statute. The following sections study the approach to such 
cases in the EU and the United States with the aim of locating the 
balancing exercise—internally or externally. 
III. THE UNITED STATES: INTERNAL BALANCING TAKES THE LEAD 
One of the most well-known U.S. cases, where the balance of 
copyright and fundamental rights played a crucial role, is Eldred v. 
Ashcroft.39 In this 2003 case, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a 
constitutional challenge of the 1988 Copyright Term Extension Act.40 In 
its judgment, the Court upheld Harper & Row,41 yet it also eased the way 
for copyright law to fall, in certain circumstances, under First 
Amendment scrutiny.42 
More precisely, the controversy concerned the extension of the 
copyright term of protection under the Copyright Term Extension Act 
(CTEA), which, in line with the EU copyright duration, extended the 
duration of copyright protection in the United States to the life of the 
author plus seventy years.43 Although this was not the first extension of 
the term of protection,44 this raised broad concerns from individuals and 
businesses that utilized copyright works already in the public domain. 
Indeed, the Act was accused of being a content-neutral regulation of 
speech that failed to pass heightened judicial scrutiny.45 
The Supreme Court emphasized that one of the purposes of 
copyright law is to promote free speech since its main objective is the 
creation and publication of expression.46 For this reason, the Copyright 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution is compatible with the First Amendment 
and in line with the “Framers’ view [that] copyright’s limited monopolies 
are compatible with free speech principles.”47 Besides, the Court 
highlighted that copyright already “contains built-in First Amendment 
                                                           
39 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
40 Id. at 193. 
41 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that 
the unauthorized use of an unpublished manuscript of a public figure has no basis in 
the First Amendment, and its publication is not a “fair use” of the manuscript). 
42 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
43 Id. at 195–96 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)). 
44 See U.S. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831 Act) (extending 
the term of copyright protection from fourteen to twenty-eight years); Act of Mar. 4, 
1909, ch. 320, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1080–1081 (1909 Act) (extending the renewed term 
of a copyright from fourteen to twenty-eight years); U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 
U.S.C. §§ 301–305 (1976 Act) (extending the term of copyright protection from twenty-
eight years to the lifetime of the author plus seventy years). 
45 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–19 (rejecting the application of heightened scrutiny to evaluate 
the measure as being “uncommon” for such content-neutral regulations). 
46 Id. at 219. 
47 Id.  
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accommodations”—namely, the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair 
use doctrine,48 both analyzed below.  
As to the idea-expression dichotomy, it “strikes a definitional 
balance between the First Amendment and copyright law by permitting 
free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s 
expression.”49 In this context, the fair use doctrine also plays a significant 
role, allowing the use of “not only facts and ideas contained in a 
copyrighted work, but also [of ]expression itself in certain 
circumstances.”50 
Aside from reinforcing the principles of Harper & Row, the 
Supreme Court, in Eldred, went further by affirming that a conflict 
between copyright and free speech is not excludable. In that sense, it 
maintained that while “[t]he First Amendment securely protects the 
freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less 
heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s 
speeches.”51 Such scrutiny may, however, be possible only if Congress 
altered “the traditional contours of copyright protection,”52 which 
apparently had not occurred in Eldred. 
Despite the suggestion of a possible clash between copyright 
protection and human rights, should Congress attempt to change the 
traditional contours of copyright, further cases have yet to make such an 
argument, suggesting by corollary that all current interventions in 
copyright law are in line with the spirit of copyright and free speech 
protection. Instead, U.S. cases that followed Eldred turned to the well-
known traditional internal safeguards, namely the idea-expression 
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine. Even if many of these claims could 
have walked through the door implicitly opened by Eldred as potential 
First Amendment infringements, the parties instead seemed to rely 
entirely on the internal safeguards. Interestingly, in some cases even the 
courts themselves, instead of recognizing a possible free-speech-
copyright conflict, immediately referred to the boundaries that Eldred 
built to dismiss such an assumption. As a result, the turning point that 
Eldred could potentially create remains untested. 
For example, Kahle v. Gonzales53 examined a dispute similar to 
that in Eldred with the CTEA under attack once again.54 The plaintiffs 
argued that the traditional contours of copyright law were altered, 
thereby asking the court to determine whether there was a First 
                                                           
48 Id. at 219–20. 
49 Id. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
556 (1985)). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 221. 
52 Id.; see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, F(r)ee Expression—Reconciling Copyright and 
the First Amendment, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 863, 873 (2016). 
53 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007). 
54 Id. at 698. 
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Amendment violation prerogative of those utilizing works already in the 
public domain.55 The Court, however, once again emphasized that 
traditional internal safeguards—the idea-expression dichotomy and fair 
use—were sufficient tools to vindicate the speech interests of those 
affected.56 
The idea-expression dichotomy has continued to play a major role 
as an internal safeguard in many cases. For example, following Professor 
Melville Nimmer’s opinion that the idea-expression dichotomy 
adequately serves the interests underlying both copyright law and 
freedom of speech, the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 judgment in Bikram’s Yoga 
College of India denied copyright protection to a sequence of yoga 
poses.57 While protection may be granted to “the particular selection 
and arrangements of ideas, as well as a given specificity in the form of 
their expression which warrants protection under the law of copyright,” 
ideas fall on the free speech side, and are, therefore, free.58 
More specifically, the court considered the issue of whether twenty-
six yoga poses and two breathing exercises were copyright protectable 
subject matter to be a question going to the core of the idea-expression 
dichotomy, “a fundamental principle underlying constitutional and 
statutory copyright protection.”59 First, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals referred explicitly to § 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976,60 
whereby ideas, procedures, processes, and the like are excluded from 
protection, regardless of the form in which they are described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied.61 Second, it highlighted that the 
idea-expression dichotomy “has two constitutional foundations: the 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.”62 
In particular, the court noted that the copyright system was 
established to promote the progress of science.63 Referencing Feist, the 
court explained that copyright grants authors exclusive rights over their 
original expression but also ensures that others can freely utilize and 
build upon ideas and information communicated by a work.64 In 
addition, the decision directly referred to Eldred to remind once again 
that the idea-expression dichotomy constitutes a “built in First 
Amendment accommodation,”65 which, in the case at hand, had 
                                                           
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 700. 
57 Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
58 Nimmer, supra note 21, at 1190. 
59 Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, 803 F.3d at 1034. 
60 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018). 
61 Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, 803 F.3d at 1037. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991)). 
65 Id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)). 
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remained firmly in place, regardless of Congress’s responses to new 
technologies and evolving understanding of creative expression.66 In 
other words, the court demonstrated that the dichotomy retains an 
applicable role in maintaining constitutional limits even when copyright 
categories expand. 
Another case that offers an interesting perspective on the 
application of the idea-expression dichotomy is the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ decision in Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Development, 
where a creator of home designs brought a lawsuit against builders 
alleging copyright infringement of architectural works and wholesale 
copying.67 The court held that although the defendant’s work shared the 
style of the plaintiff, it nonetheless took nothing from the original 
expression since an important distinction is to be made between copying 
and wrongful copying—two elements very often confused.68  
The decision pointed out that “[n]ot every portion or aspect of a 
copyrighted work is given copyright law’s protection.”69 Moreover, “the 
history [a work] describes, the facts it mentions, and the ideas it 
embraces, are in the public domain free for others to draw upon.”70 It is 
instead the peculiar expressions of that history, those facts, and those 
ideas that belong exclusively to their author.71 Eventually, what was 
deemed to be copied in Zalewsky were just the unprotected elements of 
the original designs, which were a function of consumer expectations, 
standard house design, and the design features of a particular house 
style.72 Colonial homes possess certain design conventions that must be 
followed and, in Zalewsky, were definitely followed by the builders.73 
For these reasons, the court concluded that the copyright was very thin, 
and only a very close copying would have constituted infringement.74 
Another important case is the well-known dispute in Williams v. 
Gaye.75 In Williams, the estate of Marvin Gaye brought a copyright 
infringement claim against Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke, among 
others, based on similarities between Marvin Gaye’s song “Got To Give 
It Up” and Pharrell Williams’s and Robin Thicke’s song “Blurred 
Lines.”76 The music industry and academia highly criticized the 
                                                           
66 Id. at 1044. 
67 Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2014). 
68 Id. at 100; see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, 3 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:164.10 (2019) 
(explaining the differences between “copying” and “wrongful copying”). 
69 Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 100. 
70 Id. at 102. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 106. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 107. 
75 Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018). 
76 Id. at 1159. 
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judgment.77 However, the most striking disapproval of the majority’s 
opinion came from the dissenting voice of Judge Nguyen. By reference 
to Eldred and Bikram’s Yoga, Judge Nguyen underlined that if it were 
not for the freedom to borrow others’ ideas and express them in new 
ways, artists would not come up with new works, and this would be of 
great detriment to our society, which will see a decrease in creativity and 
works of art.78 
Eventually, all these cases demonstrate the point eloquently 
expressed by Professor Nimmer already in 1970: “while the 
idea/expression dichotomy may come in the way of free speech, it is 
nevertheless justified as it facilitates the democratic dialogue.”79 
The other internal safeguard to free speech proposed by Eldred is 
the fair use doctrine. Originally rooted in case law, this is now codified 
in § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976.80 Described as the most 
important and far reaching safeguard to free speech, fair use acts as a 
defense to copyright infringement and shields users from copyright 
infringement liability.81 Justice Story’s words from 1841, that “a fair and 
bona fide abridgement of an original work is not a piracy,”82 laid the 
foundation for the modern fair use doctrine, which now includes four 
factors weighed in light of the purposes of copyright law.83 Because of its 
roots in equity, the fair use doctrine is inherently open to interpretation, 
and this produces most case law within the context of copyright 
defenses.84 
In order to appreciate fair use’s interaction with free speech, one 
should, again, trace the jurisprudence. For example, in A & M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.—an important decision pre-dating the Eldred case—
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the claim that 
                                                           
77 See Yvette Joy Liebesman, Revisiting Innovative Technologies to Determine 
Substantial Similarity in Musical Composition Infringement Lawsuits, 59 IDEA 157, 
171 (2018). 
78 Williams, 885 F.3d at 1184–85 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
79 Nimmer, supra note 21, at 1192. 
80 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
81 L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1–36 
(1987) (explaining how fair use policies strike a balance between the economic rights of 
the copyright holder, the dissemination of ideas, and the learning function of 
copyrighted material). 
82 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345.  
83 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a 
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110–11 (1990); Shira Perlmutter & W.F. 
Patry, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L. J. 667, 685–87 (1993)). 
84 See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008) (explaining that, in the twenty-eight years from the 
January 1, 1978, effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act to the year 2005, there were 
306 reported federal court opinions from 215 cases that made substantial use of section 
107’s four-factor test). 
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defendant’s First Amendment rights were infringed by virtue of 
plaintiff’s preliminary injunction request.85 The case concerned the 
contributory and vicarious liability of Napster, a peer-to-peer file sharing 
platform.86 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found Napster liable, 
rejected the argument that Napster users were covered by fair use, and 
did not even begin to analyze Napster’s First Amendment claim.87 
Following Eldred, two further cases decided by the federal courts 
of appeals demonstrate once again that the judiciary has always deemed 
the fair use doctrine an adequate internal safeguard of the copyright 
system, obviating any reference to First Amendment concerns. In 2006, 
a case involved the famous visual artist, Jeff Koons, who was accused of 
copyright infringement by the photographer Andrea Blanch.88 For one 
of his projects, Easyfun-Ethereal, Jeff Koons collected images from 
advertisements, which he then scanned and digitally superimposed 
against backgrounds of pastoral landscapes.89 The resulting work, 
Niagara, depicted four pairs of women’s feet and lower legs, confections 
such as a chocolate fudge brownies, donuts and pastries, and the Niagara 
Falls in the background.90 One of the images of the pairs of legs was 
taken from a photograph by the plaintiff.91 As a professional fashion 
photographer, Andrea Blanch had shot the photograph as part of an 
advertisement for Allure magazine.92 She claimed copyright 
infringement since the photo was used without her authorization. 
The court, however, ruled that Koons’s use was fair, and he did 
not infringe the copyright of the photographer since the two works had 
a different objective.93 More precisely, Koons’ work was deemed to be 
transformative.94 While Blanch aimed at depicting the “erotic sense” and 
“sexuality” of the photographs,95 Koons had juxtaposed women’s legs 
against a backdrop of food and landscape in order to comment on how 
some of our most basic appetites as a society are mediated by popular 
images,96 and to “satirize life . . . when seen through the prism of slick 
fashion photography.97 
Indeed, subsequent jurisprudence followed the same line of 
reasoning—using a copyrighted expression as raw material and 
                                                           
85 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2001). 
86 Id. at 1010–1011. 
87 Id. at 1027–28. 
88 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006). 
89 Id. at 247. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 247–48. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 252–53. 
94 Id. at 253. 
95 Id. at 248. 
96 Id. at 247, 261. 
97 Id. at 255. 
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transforming it into new information, new aesthetics, insights, and 
understandings is the precise type of activity that the fair use doctrine 
strives to protect with the aim of enriching our society.98 A transformative 
use, whereby something new is inserted with a novel purpose, changes 
and alters the first work by conferring on it a new expression, meaning, 
or message, which is precisely the free speech aspect that one would aim 
to safeguard.  
Interestingly, Koons never mentioned the First Amendment. Still, 
when one looks at the cases to identify their objective, the free speech 
concerns somehow crystallize. Indeed, saying that Koons used an earlier 
image as “fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic 
consequences of mass media”99 is just another way of saying that artists 
exercise their free speech prerogative in an attempt to satirize the culture 
and attitudes promoted in mass media. 
In another fair use case, Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals approved an allegedly infringing work because it represented 
a new expression employing new aesthetics with creative and 
communicative features.100 There, photographer Patrick Cariou sued the 
world-famous appropriation artist, Richard Prince, for incorporating 
thirty of Cariou’s Rastafarian photographs in an exhibition.101 When 
assessing the transformative nature of the work, the court found it 
important that the work presented a new aesthetic and that Prince’s 
paintings would reasonably be perceived as different from Cariou’s 
photographs.102 Indeed, Cariou’s photographs were black-and-white and 
9 ½” x 12,”103 while Prince’s works were in color, included distorted 
human forms, and were between ten and a hundred times the size of 
the original photographs.104 The composition, presentation, scale, color 
palette, and media of Prince’s work were fundamentally different and 
“new” compared to Cariou’s photographs, meaning the expressive 
nature of Prince’s work was different.105 This seemed to be the decisive 
aspect and could be considered a form of expressive freedom for which 
the fair use doctrine was implicated in the case. 
In Cariou, the court, by leniently assessing transformative purpose, 
permitted the Prince’s work to overcome the hurdle of fair use, as it 
transformed the copyrighted work into “something new,” without 
actually specifying what this new something was.106 This demonstrates 
                                                           
98 See id. at 251–52 (citing Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp, Inc., 150 F.3d 
132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
99 Id. at 253. 
100 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707–08 (2d Cir. 2013). 
101 Id. at 698–99. 
102 Id. at 707. 
103 Id. at 706. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 706. 
106 See id. at 710. 
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that the internal safeguard of free speech, in the context of the fair use 
doctrine, can be very flexible and far reaching. Consequently, in U.S. 
jurisprudence, internal safeguards—namely the idea-expression 
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine—govern the interaction between 
copyright and human rights. 
In addition to these mechanical internal balancing instruments, 
U.S. courts tend to resort to the “shared goal argument” as another 
substantive internal safeguard.107 According to this argument, both 
copyright and free speech aim at promoting progress108—the former 
provides incentives for the production of speech, while the latter is 
responsible for protecting that production.109 In doing so, they take 
different routes to achieve the same goal of promoting speech, which is 
supplemented by the division of labor argument.110 In such a case, a 
conflict between copyright and free speech rarely arises, as the copyright 
system itself is more than equipped to accommodate free speech. 
IV. THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU: DANCING TO THE 
CHARTER’S TUNE? 
In the EU, concerns for the functioning of the EU’s internal 
market have traditionally driven legislative action in the field of 
copyright.111 Thus, the need to harmonize copyright laws with directives 
and regulations emerges whenever differences in the legislations of the 
Member States risk jeopardizing the free movement of goods and 
services.112 The key provisions in this respect are Articles 26 and 114 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. These two legal 
bases are rather general in their wording. The former broadly states that 
the Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring 
the functioning of the internal market, while the latter entails the specific 
                                                           
107 See Michael Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic View, in COPYRIGHT 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS—FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION—INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—
PRIVACY 37, 46, 49–50, 60 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2004) (explaining and providing 
examples of courts using the “shared goal argument”). 
108 See Greg A. Perry, Copyright and the First Amendment: Nurturing the Seeds for 
Harvest: Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (1985), 65 
NEB. L. REV. 631, 652 (1986) (“[C]opyright and the first amendment serve the same 
laudable purpose–the fullest possible dissemination of ideas and information for the 
ultimate benefit of the general public.”). 
109 See PAUL L.C. TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(3d ed. 2015). 
110 Birnhack, supra note 107, at 46, 49. 
111 See ELEONORA ROSATI, COPYRIGHT AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 10 (2019); Maria José Schmidt-Kessen, EU Digital Single Market Strategy, 
Digital Content and Geo-Blocking: Costs and Benefits of Partitioning EU’s Internal 
Market, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 561, 570–71 (2018) (explaining the conflict between 
territorial copyright restrictions and the EU’s efforts to create an internal market). 
112 ROSATI, supra note 111. 
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EU legislative procedure for achieving that aim, namely the ordinary 
legislative procedure.113 
This legal arrangement has produced a long list of directives and 
regulations in the field of EU copyright law in a highly fragmented 
manner. Consequently, when it comes to copyright disputes, Member 
States are now in a situation where the law to be applied is a hodgepodge 
of EU and national law.114 Such a piecemeal harmonization often leads 
to situations in which national courts are obliged to apply a provision of 
EU law, yet are somewhat unclear as to the interpretation of the 
provision. Certain norms are not precisely defined in EU laws because 
Member States struggle to reach political agreement on key notions, 
and, at the same time, the EU legislature has intentionally left certain 
concepts undefined in order to avoid the need for political 
compromises.115 Inevitably, what happens in these circumstances is that 
the national courts, unsure of how to interpret various EU norms, stays 
the proceedings and refers specific questions for guidance to the CJEU. 
This procedure is called “preliminary reference.”116 By providing its 
interpretation of the unclear norm at stake, the CJEU has taken up the 
task of filling in the apparent gaps117 and defining certain notions as 
autonomous concepts of EU law to further the harmonization agenda.118 
This has led some scholars to characterize the court as a co-legislator.119 
The conflict between copyright and fundamental rights 
materializes in front of the CJEU as a result of preliminary references 
by national courts. In fact, this happens quite often.120 In this process of 
interpretation of the legislative acquis, the CJEU has regularly referred 
to the Charter as a guiding principle to such an extent that academics 
                                                           
113 ROBERT SCHÜTZE, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151 (2d ed. 2015). 
114 Niilo Jääskinen, Europeanisation of National Law: A Legal-Theoretical Analysis, 40 
EUR. L. REV. 667, 668 (2015). 
115 Vincent Cassiers & Alain Strowel, Intellectual Property Law Made by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 175, 
178 (Christophe Geiger, Craig Allen Nard, & Xavier Seuba eds., 2018). 
116 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 267, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 
163. 
117 Jonathan Griffiths, Taking Power Tools to the Acquis—the Court of Justice, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and European Union Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 144, 144 (Christophe Geiger, Craig Allen Nard, & 
Xavier Seuba eds., 2018); see also Cassiers and Strowel, supra note 115, at 183–85. 
118 ROSATI, supra note 112, at 79; PAUL TORREMANS & IRINI STAMATOUDI, EU 
COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY 11 (2014). 
119 Cassiers & Strowel, supra note 115. 
120 Bernd Justin Jütte & João Pedro Quintais, Conference on Freedom of Expression 
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have labelled this development the “constitutionalization” of IP law.121 
The need to balance copyright law with other fundamental rights has 
emerged primarily in the context of economic rights,122 exceptions and 
limitations,123 and intermediaries’ liability for third parties’ copyright 
infringement online.124 Despite these numerous instances in which 
concerns for fundamental rights formed part of the court’s judgment, 
the CJEU does not always delve deep into the discussion of balancing 
copyright and fundamental rights. The two areas in which this discussion 
has indeed taken place more evidently are the cases on intermediaries’ 
liability and, more recently, the field of exceptions and limitations. For 
that reason, this analysis focuses on these two subjects. 
                                                           
121 See Griffiths, supra note 117, at 144; see also Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” 
Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual 
Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 371, 
371 (2006); Jonathan Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising? The Court of 
Justice, the Right to Property and European Copyright Law, 38 EUR. L. REV. 65, 65 
(2013) [hereinafter Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising?]; Tuomas Mylly, The 
Constitutionalisation of the European Legal Order: Impact of Human Rights on 
Intellectual Property in the EU, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 103, 103 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015). 
122 See Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV (Apr. 7, 2016), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=175626&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-479/04, Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet, 2006 E.C.R. I-
8093;. 
123 See, e.g., Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck (Jan. 10, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209682&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (Dec. 12, 2018), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=208881&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Oct. 25, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=207024&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN; Case C-201/13, 
Deckmyn v. Vandersteen (May 22, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=152656&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN; Case C-145/10, 
Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533; Case C-467/08, Padawan SL 
v. SGAE, 2010 E.C.R. I-10055. 
124 See, e.g., Case C-484/14, Tobias McFadden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany 
GmbH (Mar. 16, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text
=&docid=175130&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN; Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien 
GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144944&page
Index=0&doclang=EN; Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119512&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio AB v. Perfect Communication 
Sweden AB (Nov. 17, 2011), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=114613&pageIndex=0&doclang
=EN; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM (Apr. 14, 2011), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=81776&pageIndex
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Before exploring these two areas of copyright law further, we need 
to map out the tools that the court uses in its analysis. The first tool in 
the EU is the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which bears the status of 
primary law.125 A strong peculiarity of the Charter, without a counterpart 
in the United States, is Article 17(2), which boldly affirms that 
intellectual property shall be protected. For that reason, the first section 
below explores the status of IP as a fundamental right. On the basis of 
this premise, the next two parts then turn to the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU on intermediaries’ liability and permitted uses respectively, where 
the CJEU was prompted to take fundamental rights concerns into 
account. 
A. Intellectual Property as a Fundamental Right 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU became an integral part of the EU 
legal order, enjoying the status of the founding treaties, with primacy 
over secondary EU law, namely directives and regulations. The most 
relevant fundamental right in the discourse on copyright law is the right 
of property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. The text of the 
Charter goes even further by stating, in Article 17(2), that intellectual 
property shall be protected. Such a bold statement, described by 
academics as a “mysterious provision with an unclear scope,”126 is 
certainly not to be considered as granting IP some “special super-
protected status,” but just as a confirmation that Article 17(1) shall also 
include the right of IP.127 Therefore, considering that the right to 
property is not an absolute right but has a qualified status and, as such, 
may be restricted in light of general interest,128 the same is applicable to 
Article 17(2) in the context of intellectual property. Indeed, the CJEU 
case law that followed confirms this position.129 In any case, even prior 
to the Charter, IP was, as part of the right of property, already 
considered a fundamental right under the European Convention of 
Human Rights.130 
Consequently, given the fundamental nature of IP rights, when a 
copyright case is referred to the CJEU, the court ought to ascertain the 
legitimacy of the measures required to prevent copyright infringement 
                                                           
125 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 8. 
126 Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall be Protected?! Article 17(2) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: A Mysterious Provision with 
an Unclear Scope, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 113, 113 (2009). 
127 Griffiths, supra note 117, at 151. 
128 See Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-4980. 
129 See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 43. 
130 See Peter Oliver & Christopher Stothers, Intellectual Property Under the Charter: 
Are the Court’s Scales Properly Calibrated?, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 517, 520 
(2017). 
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in light of the other fundamental rights protected under the Charter—
mainly, freedom of expression, but also the right to privacy and the 
freedom to conduct business. All of these human rights are equal and, 
thus, none can prevail automatically over the others.131 
Interestingly, the Charter itself encompasses how to carry out this 
assessment—the proportionality test.132 Referred to as a “mega” or 
“golden” standard in European copyright law,133 the test is rooted in 
German administrative law.134 It has now spread to other fields and refers 
to the understanding that constitutional rights are relative and not 
absolute and, therefore, should be balanced against each other.135 
Today, the test is regularly called upon to outline the constitutional 
limits of a particular norm in a democratic society.136 In the context of 
EU copyright law, the test has been employed as a general principle of 
EU law and also as a principle enshrined in the EU copyright directives 
themselves.137 
Four steps traditionally form the proportionality test: “proper 
purpose, rational connection, necessary means[,] and a proper relation 
between the benefit gained by realizing the proper purpose and the 
harm caused to the constitutional right.”138 In other words, after 
establishing the legitimacy of the pursued objective,139 one then turns to 
the principle of suitability, also called the principle of appropriateness.140 
At this stage, the question becomes whether the measure chosen is 
suitable to pursue the legitimate objective. The measure would be 
                                                           
131 Peggy Ducoulombier, Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights: An Overview, in CONFLICTS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 217, 234 (Eva Brems ed., 2008). 
132 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 52(1), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 
1, 28. 
133 See Orit Fischman Afori, Proportionality—A New Mega Standard in European 
Copyright Law, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 889, 892 (2014); Alain 
Strowel & Hee-Eun Kim, The Balancing Impact of General EU Law on European 
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEANIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL METHODOLOGY 112 (Justine Pila & 
Ansgar Ohly eds., 2013). 
134 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality, Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 75 (2008). 
135 AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS 177 (2012). 
136 VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 40 
(2013). 
137 ROSATI, supra note 112, at 45. 
138 BARAK, supra note 135, at 131. 
139 Wolf Sauter, Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?, 15 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. 
LEGAL STUD. 439, 448 (2013); Stone Sweet and Matthews, supra note 134, at 76. 
140 Sauter, supra note 139, at 448–49; see also Case C-331/88, R v. Ministry of Agric., 
Fisheries and Food, 1990 E.C.R. I-4023. 
19
Montagnani and Trapova: Copyright and Human Rights in the Ballroom: A Minuet between the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
632 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:3 
suitable if it possesses a minimum degree of effectiveness.141 Next is the 
principle of necessity, also dubbed as strict necessity, which requires that 
no other equally suitable, less restrictive measure is available.142 
Traditionally, at this stage, the chosen measure should not restrict the 
right more than it is necessary to achieve the legitimate objective.143 The 
final step is proportionality in the narrow sense (stricto sensu), whereby 
the measure should not disrupt the fair balance between the conflicting 
rights or destroy the essence of the right that is restricted.144 At this final 
stage, the actual balancing takes place. The benefit gained by the 
purpose of the law is weighed against the harm caused to the 
fundamental right.145 This last stage creates a relationship by balancing 
without damaging the core of the fundamental right.146 The four 
elements of the test, while evaluated separately, eventually come to 
function as communicating vessels.147 
Against this background, it has been observed that, in the 
contemporary digital environment, it is particularly difficult to reconcile 
fundamental rights—such as freedom of expression, privacy, data 
protection, and freedom to conduct business—with copyright law as a 
fundamental right of its own.148 The proportionality test outlined above 
is often combined with a reference to the need to strike a fair balance 
between different rights and interests.149 
When one turns to analyze the copyright case law of the CJEU, 
two fields stand out: intermediaries’ liability and permitted uses. The 
former pertains to the balancing of many crucial fundamental rights. 
From the point of view of the copyright holder, the right to property 
under Article 17 of the Charter is key, which, as observed, also covers 
copyright. From the point of view of internet users, on the other hand, 
                                                           
141 JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN, FAIR BALANCE: A STUDY OF PROPORTIONALITY, 
SUBSIDIARITY AND PRIMARITY IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
96 (2009); Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 134, at 76. 
142 Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 134, at 75 (“[T]he core of necessity analysis is the 
deployment of a ‘least-restrictive means’ (LRM) test: the judge ensures that the measure 
does not curtail the right any more than is necessary for the government to achieve its 
stated goals.”). 
143 Id. at 76. 
144 BARAK, supra note 135, at 131–33, 340–70; CHRISTOFFERSEN, supra note 141, at 19–
20. 
145 BARAK, supra note 135, at 343. 
146 Peter Teunissen, The Balance Puzzle: The ECJ’s Method of Proportionality Review 
in EU Copyright Law, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV, 579, 582 (2018). 
147 Id. 
148 Sari Depreeuw, Irina Baraliuc & Serge Gutwirth, Copyright Enforcement in the 
Digital Age: A Post-ACTA View on the Balancing of Fundamental Rights, 21 INT. J.L. 
INF. TECH. 92, 92 (2013). 
149 ROSATI, supra note 112, at 50 (stating that sometimes the fair balance is actually an 
expression of the proportionality assessment as opposed to a self-standing standard of 
its own). 
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the freedom of information pursuant to Article 11 and the protection of 
personal data under Article 8 are discussed, especially when injunctions, 
coupled with the imposition of filtering measures, are concerned.150 
Finally, from the intermediaries’ perspective, the freedom to conduct 
business under Article 16 is often implicated.151 Such a wide diversity of 
fundamental rights necessitates a fair balance assessment between many 
different interests since, in these cases, the relevant secondary legislation 
does not deal explicitly with the intersection of copyright and 
fundamental rights.152 
The second category of cases, that of permitted uses, has come 
under the detailed scrutiny of the CJEU in three very recent Grand 
Chamber judgments.153 Also referred to as “the triad,”154 these cases 
focus on the nature of balancing—internal or external—and pertain to the 
brittle interaction between exceptions and limitations in EU law and 
exclusive economic rights. For these reasons, the following sections dive 
deep into the reasoning of the court and underpin its leading 
methodology. In all cases, the Charter does indeed figure as a relevant 
element in the discussion. Yet, very often, the actual balancing exercise 
lacks sound methodology, an approach Professor Peukert describes as 
“ad hoc balancing lacking a clear transparent normative framework.”155 
B. Intermediaries’ Liability Cases 
Because the field is entirely characterized by technology, the cases 
regarding online intermediaries’ liability have attracted particularly high 
                                                           
150 See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs compositeurs et 
éditeurs (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 50 (noting that implementation of a 
filtering system may infringe on internet users’ rights under Articles 8 and 11 of the 
Charter). 
151 Id. paras. 46–49 (noting that a fair balance must be struck between the intellectual 
property rights of copyright holders and the freedom to conduct business under Article 
16 of the Charter). 
152 Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising?, supra note 121, at 72. 
153 See Case C‑469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(July 29, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=207024&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN; Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Volker Beck (July 29, 2019) 
http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209682&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN; Case 
C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019), http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=208881&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN. 
154 Caterina Sganga, A Decade of Fair Balance Doctrine, and How to Fix It: Copyright 
Versus Fundamental Rights Before the CJEU from Promusicae to Funke Medien, 
Pelham and Spiegel Online, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 683, 690 (2019). 
155 Alexander Peukert, The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the 
Discretion of the Legislature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 135 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015). 
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levels of attention as far as the balancing of different interests are 
concerned. In 2008, the first such case before the CJEU involved 
remedies for copyright enforcement.156 Promusicae, the Spanish 
copyright collecting society for the record industry, brought to court 
Telefónica, a Spanish internet access provider, in an attempt to disclose 
the identities and physical addresses of users exchanging files through 
the peer-to-peer file sharing platform, KaZaA.157 The CJEU was 
particularly brief in discussing the substance of these rights and the 
application of the proportionality principle. The court’s starting point, 
however, was that Member States should maintain a fair balance 
between the right to property, the right to privacy, and data protection 
in the transposition of the directives at stake.158 To do that, national 
courts must interpret national law in line with general principles of the 
law, such as, proportionality.159 The court, however, limited itself only to 
this rather brief remark and did not delve into the steps of the 
proportionality test. This was in line with the court’s approach in 
L’Oreal v. eBay, where the court was similarly succinct in its elaboration 
of the proportionality test but in the context of trademark law.160 The 
CJEU in Promusicae left it to the national court to expand upon its own 
understanding of fair balance.161 It seems as though Member States are 
presumed to be familiar with the peculiarities of the test without the 
necessity of any further guidance by the CJEU. 
Next, the court dealt with two cases that concerned the 
requirement to install a filtering system to monitor user activity to 
prevent the presence of copyright infringing material. The copyright and 
fundamental rights intersection came to the limelight in the context of 
internet service providers’ and hosting providers’ liability in Scarlet 
Extended162 and Netlog163 respectively. These two cases were eventually 
joined. While the former concerned an internet service provider and 
the latter a hosting provider, both eventually turned on the question of 
whether an intermediary is required to install a filtering system to 
monitor the activity of its users and prevent copyright infringing material 
from appearing on its services.164 Various fundamental rights were at 
stake—namely, the copyright holders’ right to intellectual property, the 
intermediaries’ freedom to conduct business , and the users’ freedom 
                                                           
156 Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271.  
157 Id. para. 30. 
158 Id. para. 54. 
159 Id. 
160 See Case C-324/09, L’Oreal v. eBay, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, paras. 143–44. 
161 Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, para. 
68. 
162 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959. 
163 Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV (Feb. 16, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119512&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN. 
164 Id. para. 26; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 36. 
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of information and right to data protection.165 The court ruled out the 
possibility of imposing such an obligation upon the intermediary as that 
would have directly clashed with Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce 
Directive, which explicitly bans the imposition of general monitoring 
obligations upon intermediaries.166 
Moreover, the court made an important reference to the need to 
fairly balance different rights. In that sense, the court eventually held 
that an injunction of the kind sought in the case would seriously interfere 
with the freedom of the intermediary to conduct business since it would 
impose on the intermediary an obligation to install a complicated and 
costly system at the intermediary’s own expense.167 Furthermore, the 
Enforcement Directive also prevented the imposition of such an 
injunction, as the obligation would have been unnecessarily complicated 
or costly.168 Therefore, the court was not convinced that the proposed 
measure would satisfy the fair balance between the opposing 
fundamental rights.169 
In the next case in this wave, the court focused its attention on a 
claim brought by the film producers Constantin Film Verleih GmbH 
and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft GmbH, who targeted the 
website kino.to, which provided access to large amounts of copyrighted 
works.170 The crux of the case was whether the Austrian internet service 
provider, UPC Telekabel, should have introduced a measure to block 
access to the website.171 At stake was a so-called “outcome prohibition,” 
whereby the intermediary would be required to take all necessary 
measures to prevent a certain outcome. In its reasoning, the court 
reiterated the importance of balancing the various rights at stake.172 The 
first balancing the court carried out was between the rightsholders’ right 
to intellectual property and the intermediaries’ freedom to conduct 
business.173 The second was between the right of intellectual property 
holders and the freedom of information of the users.174 
                                                           
165 Case C-360/10, SABAM, para. 1; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R. 
I-11959, paras. 1–4. 
166 Case C-360/10, SABAM, para. 38; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R. 
I-11959, para. 112. 
167 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 48. 
168 Parliament and Council Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 3(1), 
2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 20. 
169 Case C-360/10, SABAM, para. 51. 
170 Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH 
(Mar. 27, 2014), 
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=0&doclang=en. 
171 Id. para. 2. 
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Regarding the balance between the freedom to conduct business 
and intellectual property rights, the court held that this type of injunction 
“does not seem to infringe the very substance of the freedom of an 
internet service provider.”175 In all cases, before the balancing exercise is 
carried out, the court must outline the actual substance of the 
fundamental right at stake. Freedom to conduct business was 
understood as the right of “any business to be able to freely use, within 
the limits of its liability for its own acts, the economics, technical and 
financial resources available to it.”176 In the present case, since the 
intermediary had the freedom to determine the measure in order to 
achieve the outcome sought, the freedom to conduct business was not 
sacrificed.177 The court, however, did not address the actual balancing 
required in the first context., Instead the court shifted the task to the 
shoulders of the intermediary by holding that “when the addressee of 
an injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings chooses the 
measures to be adopted in order to comply with that injunction, he must 
ensure compliance with the fundamental right of internet users to 
freedom of information.”178 
Surprisingly, the intermediary itself must do the balancing as well, 
not only the national authorities. This is in sync with the recent 
legislative pushes in the EU to make intermediaries more responsible 
for the content they host.179 Nevertheless, even though intermediaries 
are often the gatekeepers of information online,180 it is questionable 
whether they are best positioned to balance the different fundamental 
rights at stake in the context of tackling copyright infringement online.181 
                                                           
175 Id. paras. 50–51. 
176 Id. para. 49. 
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copyright content and audio-visual media services) (2018). 
180 Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J. L. TECH. 253, 253 
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https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/48685066.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7HS-
WNRT]. 
181 See Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights in Copyright 
Enforcement Online: Elaborating A Legal Framework for Website Blocking, 32 AM. 
U. L. REV. 44, 93 (2016). 
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In the balance between freedom of information of users and 
intellectual property rights, the CJEU was more diligent in its reference 
to the three steps of proportionality that the intermediary should 
undertake.182 As far as the legitimate aim was concerned, the court 
emphasized that the measure adopted by the intermediary should 
strictly target infringing activity without impinging on users’ lawful use of 
the services to access information.183 To ensure appropriateness of the 
measure, the measure should be “sufficiently effective to ensure genuine 
protection of the fundamental right at issue.”184 In that sense, the 
measure should “have the effect of preventing unauthorised access to 
the protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve 
and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using the services 
of the addressee of that injunction from accessing the subject-matter 
made available to them in breach of that fundamental right.”185 
As far as the necessity step was concerned, the court briefly 
mentioned that the adopted measure should not unnecessarily deprive 
users of the possibility to lawfully access the information available.186 The 
actual balancing in the last stage of the proportionality test was not 
carried out, but the court nevertheless concluded that there was a fair 
balance between the freedom of information and the right to intellectual 
property.187 Although the court’s weighing of the interests remained 
brief, some have suggested that this was expected given the outcome 
prohibition at stake.188 
Next, in McFadden, the operator of an open wireless network, who 
sold and leased sound and lighting systems, found himself in court when 
Sony Music served him a formal notice because an anonymous user had 
downloaded infringing content via McFadden’s Wi-Fi network.189 
McFadden operated a Wi-Fi network free-of-charge, permitting anyone 
to log in without registering or revealing personal data.190 He insisted that 
he was shielded from liability due to the safe harbor exemption of 
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive.191 On this point, McFadden 
was successful, as the safe harbor exemption was upheld, and no 
                                                           
182 See Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, 
para. 63 (Mar. 27, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
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187 Id. paras. 63–65. 
188 Oliver and Stothers, supra note 130, at 557. 
189 Case C-484/14, Tobias McFadden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH 
(Sept. 15, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
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191 Id. para. 33. 
25
Montagnani and Trapova: Copyright and Human Rights in the Ballroom: A Minuet between the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
638 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:3 
damages could be awarded.192 Yet, another remedy—an injunction—was 
still on the table. Upon referral from the national court, three possible 
remedies were discussed.193 Each was examined by the CJEU in turn, 
providing the first case to date where the CJEU thoroughly applied the 
proportionality analysis. 
First, it was proposed that all information passing through the 
internet connection be monitored by the internet service provider.194 
Since this was in direct clash with Article 15 of the E-Commerce 
Directive that banned general monitoring activities, it was quickly 
dismissed. The second option was to terminate the internet access.195 
Since this was not at odds with the prohibition on general monitoring, 
the relevant rights—namely, McFadden’s freedom to conduct business 
and Sony Music’s right to intellectual property—were weighted.196 The 
court held that absent the consideration of less restrictive measures, the 
decision to terminate the service provider’s internet connection would 
seriously impinge on McFadden’s freedom to conduct business.197 In 
other words, the court ruled that, since there were less restrictive 
measures that had not been evaluated, termination of internet access 
would be improper. 
The third option was password protecting the network.198 Two 
possible clashes with fundamental rights were discussed here. On the 
one hand, there was a potential problem with restricting McFadden’s 
freedom to conduct business, while on the other hand, users’ right to 
freedom of information would have been affected.199  
Unlike UPC Telekabel, the court itself performed the balancing, 
instead of shifting the obligation to the intermediary. In the context of 
the freedom to conduct business, the court ruled that a fair balance was 
struck, as the essence of the right to conduct business was not affected.200 
All that was required was a slight adjustment of one of the technical 
options available, namely to password protect the Wi-Fi network.201 
Regarding the users’ freedom of information, the court held that 
protecting the network with a password would not clash with the 
objective of the measure since such a technical restriction would not 
constitute an outright block to all internet access.202 As for the suitability 
requirement, the court followed the familiar line of reasoning, whereby 
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the effectiveness of the chosen measure should be capable of at least 
making it difficult for users to infringe copyright or seriously discourage 
them from doing so.203 Hence, a password restriction was a suitable 
solution since users would have to reveal their identity and could not act 
anonymously to obtain the required password.204 
From the three possible remedies, password protection was 
deemed a necessary measure, which made the discussion of this step 
rather brief. Moving onto the balancing exercise as part of the 
proportionality stricto sensu step, the court found that securing an 
internet connection did not appear to undermine the essence of users’ 
right to freedom of information as long as it was limited to a password 
requirement.205 
The crux of the court’s analysis was preserving the essence of the 
fundamental rights concerned. Should the line be crossed and the 
essence of these rights be violated, the benefits of the pursued aim would 
be outweighed by the harm done to conflicting fundamental rights.206 
Surprisingly, even though McFadden seems to be the most elaborate 
application of the proportionality test, it still failed to consider the wider 
picture of fundamental rights involved since the right to private life 
pursuant to Article 7 of the Charter and data protection under Article 8 
of the Charter were entirely excluded from the analysis. Since the 
chosen remedy of password protection required users to reveal 
personal, indefinable information, users’ concerns should have been 
taken into consideration. 
Consequently, whenever copyright law and fundamental rights 
norms clash in the context of intermediaries, the dispute is resolved by 
reference to external copyright safeguards, namely the Charter, also 
dubbed an “explicit constitutional constraint on copyright.”207 In these 
cases, unlike the category of permitted uses evaluated below, 
fundamental rights act as an autonomous ground to limit specific 
enforcement measures. What is evident, however, is that the 
proportionality analysis albeit invoked by the CJEU and explicitly 
required by the directives, is only applied superficially. Further, the test 
has been widely criticized by academics as inappropriate because it 
positions the right to property against all other rights, resting on the 
presumption that all fundamental rights are equal and, thereby, merely 
replacing one ambiguity with another without any true guidance.208 The 
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206 Teunissen, supra note 146, at 591. 
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structure and clarity needed to improve the test can come only through 
consistency in the judgments, but to date, such consistency is lacking.209 
While the CJEU does not apply the proportionality test in its 
complete form in most cases, one can forgive the court for not providing 
full guidance, as the fair balance test is heavily fact specific. This is 
sometimes seen as a positive facet, allowing the courts to transform a 
complex, principle-based conflict into a primarily factual one that 
facilitates pragmatic solutions.210 However, at the same time, the EU 
legislature should have been clearer and more consistent when drafting 
legislation fit for information society services.211 Some authors suggest 
that copyright always had to strike a balance between the competing 
interests of authors, intermediaries, and the public, which made vesting 
large discretion to the courts the most appropriate course.212  
In any case, the true problem arises when the court attempts to 
apply the proportionality test—as in McFadden—but omits some 
important fundamental rights from the analysis. This is how the 
proportionality test becomes “without further elucidation, vacuous and 
unhelpful.”213 Other authors argue that the reason for such superficial 
application of the proportionality test lies in the CJEU’s very selective 
reference to fundamental rights in these cases, to the extent that the 
CJEU has been accused of referring to fundamental rights only when 
they support an interpretation already reached by recourse to other 
interpretative methods.214 
C. Exceptions and Limitations Cases 
The other category of copyright cases under the fundamental rights 
radar pertains to exceptions and limitations, i.e. permitted uses. While 
in Painer215 and Deckmyn,216 the CJEU strictly focused on internal 
balancing as instructed by recital 31 of the InfoSoc Directive, three 
recent cases from the CJEU’s Grand Chamber question whether the 
balancing can take place outside the boundaries of copyright legislation. 
On July 29, 2019, the CJEU delivered three much-awaited 
judgments bearing on the relationship between copyright law and 
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fundamental rights, namely, Funke Medien,217 Spiegel Online,218 and 
Pelham Moses.219 All three cases landed at the CJEU upon a referral 
from Germany and centered on the question of whether fundamental 
rights as such can justify limitations on copyright. The CJEU was asked 
to decide whether the balancing can take place outside of the internal 
mechanisms incorporated in the InfoSoc Directive—in these particular 
cases, outside of the framework for exceptions and limitations. The 
Advocate General in all three cases was Advocate General (AG) 
Szpunar, whose opinions have gained significant commentary from 
academia.220 Before delving into the analysis of the approach taken by 
the CJEU, a brief summary of the facts in the three cases are provided 
below, together with the opinion of the AG. 
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juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN. 
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document.jsf?text=&docid=208881&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN. 
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Way to Go!, 51 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 282, 285 (2020); 
Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Freedom of Expression as an External 
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1. Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Funke Medien concerned a dispute between the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Funke Medien, the operator of the website of a daily 
newspaper.221 The conflict involved Funke Medien’s the publication of 
a large portion of military status reports, known as the “Afghanistan 
Papers,” drawn up on a weekly basis by the Federal Armed Forces 
pertaining to the deployments of the armed forces.222 Funke Medien had 
applied for access to these reports spanning from September 1, 2001, 
through September 26, 2012; but for reasons of confidentiality and 
security-sensitive interests of the Federal Armed Forces, the request was 
denied.223 Nonetheless, the company obtained access to a large portion 
of these briefings and eventually published them.224 
The Federal Republic of Germany brought proceedings for 
copyright infringement and was granted an injunction by the first 
instance court, which was upheld on appeal.225 The case then reached 
the German Federal Court of Justice, which stayed the proceedings and 
referred several questions to the CJEU for guidance.226 The CJEU was 
essentially asked: (1) whether Member States enjoy certain leeway on 
the implementation of exclusive rights and exceptions into national law; 
(2) how fundamental rights must be taken into consideration when 
interpreting limitations and exceptions; and (3) whether fundamental 
rights can justify adoption of permitted uses beyond those provided in 
the InfoSoc Directive.227 
In this case, the AG took a step back and, before resolving the 
specific questions, addressed a crucial point, namely, whether a military 
report, being a non-fictional work, enjoys copyright protection in the 
first place. The AG skeptically stated that it is rather unlikely that when 
these reports were drafted, the authors, who were unknown, could 
exercise free and creative choices to express their creative abilities.228 
Thus, due to the “purely informative” nature of the documents, 
“inevitably drafted in simple and neutral terms,” these documents 
lacked the necessary originality to warrant copyright protection in the 
first place.229 Having said that, the AG went further to assess the brittle 
copyright and fundamental rights intersection and concluded that, in 
                                                           
221 Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para. 
10 (Oct. 25, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
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228 Id. para. 19. 
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this particular case, permitting a government to invoke fundamental 
protection in the form of copyright against its citizens “would be at odds 
with the very rationale behind fundamental rights . . . which is to protect 
individuals against the State, not the State against individuals.”230 The 
AG’s opinion has been described as a welcome reminder that copyright 
is not the most important thing; rather, it serves a very specific purpose—
something that, amidst the ubiquity of copyright discussion in the EU 
copyright reform, may have been forgotten.231 
2. Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck 
Spiegel Online involved the dispute between the German 
politician, Volker Beck, and the news publisher Spiegel Online. Beck, 
a member of the Bundestag from 1994 to 2017, had written a piece on 
criminal policy relating to sexual offenses committed against minors.232 
The piece was published anonymously as part of a book compilation in 
1988. When the compilation was put together, the publisher changed 
the title of Beck’s contribution and shortened one of its sentences.233 
Over the years, the author tried to actively distance himself from the 
work that was published.234 In 2013, when Beck was running as a 
candidate in the parliamentary elections in Germany, the manuscript of 
the work emerged from the archives.235 In an attempt to demonstrate 
that his work had been amended by the publisher, Beck provided 
various newspaper editors with his original manuscript and the amended 
version.236 Importantly, however, he did not authorize the publication of 
the two documents. Instead, on his personal page, he provided versions 
of the two documents and accompanied them with the qualification, “I 
dissociate myself from this contribution,” and also added a note to the 
article published in the book stating that the publisher had distorted the 
text.237 
The defendant news site, Spiegel Online, published an article 
claiming that Beck had been misleading the public for years since the 
content of his manuscript had essentially not been distorted by the 
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publisher in the original 1988 publication.238 In the article, Spiegel 
Online also made the original versions of the manuscript and the article 
as published in the book available for download via hyperlinks.239 The 
two versions provided by Spiegel Online did not contain the disclaimers 
made by Beck in order to allow the public to make their own 
unprejudiced assessment.240 Beck requested that Spiegel Online replace 
the files with actual hyperlinks to his personal website, where the two 
documents contained the disclaimers. Since Spiegel Online refused to 
do so, Beck claimed copyright infringement on the basis that his article 
had been made available on Speigel Online’s website without his 
authorization.241 
The news portal based its defense on the exception to copyright 
infringement for the purpose of reporting current events and quotation. 
It argued that, when evaluated in the context of the fundamental right to 
information and the press, the two provisions exempted their actions 
from copyright infringement. The first and the second instance courts 
in Germany ruled in favor of Beck and upheld the copyright 
infringement claim.242 Eventually, when the case reached the German 
Federal Court of Justice, the court stayed the proceedings and referred 
several questions to the CJEU for guidance, many of which overlapped 
with those in the Funke Medien case.243 
The discourse essentially turned on the delicate interaction 
between copyright-exclusive rights, exceptions, and limitations, and 
fundamental rights. Among other things, the CJEU was asked to 
determine how fundamental rights from the Charter must be taken into 
account when determining the scope of copyright exceptions and 
limitations244—in particular, whether fundamental rights of freedom and 
information or freedom of the press justify permitted uses beyond those 
explicitly provided in the InfoSoc Directive.245 AG Szpunar stressed the 
exhaustive nature of the exceptions and limitations in the InfoSoc 
Directive.246 Accordingly, Member States cannot adopt permitted uses 
unless the uses are present in the Article 5 catalogue. 
In the present case, the AG found that none of the permitted uses 
applied to the activities of Spiegel Online.247 In response to the question 
on whether fundamental rights concerns can justify going beyond the 
                                                           
238 Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 14 (Jan. 10, 2019) (opinion of 
Advocate General Szpunar). 
239 Id. 
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closed list of exceptions and limitations, the AG firmly rejected this as a 
possible option.248 According to him, copyright law itself already 
contained internal mechanisms like the specific exceptions and 
limitations aimed at reconciling the exclusive rights of authors with 
fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression.249 In other words, 
the court cannot overstep its powers and become a legislature by 
bringing in a “fair use clause” into the EU copyright framework.250 
Nonetheless, the public’s interest in allowing Spiegel Online’s use and 
the lack of economic prejudice to Beck prompted some academics to 
describe the case as a “paradigmatic case of a fair use.”251 
3. Pelham GmbH v. Hütter 
The third case in this famous triad,252 Pelham GmbH, concerned a 
dispute between the German band Kraftwerk and the producer 
company Pelham GmbH.253 The facts of the case center on the issue of 
digital sound sampling—a technique of electronically copying a portion, 
or sample, of a sound recording for the purpose of reusing it in a new 
sound recording. When incorporated into a new sound recording, the 
samples are often mixed, modified, and looped.254 The dispute revolved 
around the song “Metall auf Metall” published by Kraftwerk in 1977.255 
Pelham sampled approximately two seconds of a rhythm sequence from 
the song and incorporated it into a continuous loop in the song “Nur 
mir” produced by Pelham and performed by the singer Sabrina Setlur.256 
Kraftwerk claimed that such use infringed its related right as a producer 
and brought a copyright infringement lawsuit in the German courts.257 
The case passed through various levels of the German judiciary. 
Kraftwerk was successful at all levels apart from the German 
Constitutional Court, which held that requiring the samplers to secure 
permission from the copyright holders would constitute an unjustified 
infringement of the right to artistic freedom provided in German Basic 
Law—i.e., the German Constitution.258 
Thereafter, the dispute, once again, ended up at the German 
Federal Court that stayed the proceedings and referred several 
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questions for interpretation to the CJEU.259 Various issues were at stake 
in this case, such as, the scope of exclusive rights and permitted uses, 
the validity of open norms, and flexibilities when implementing 
exceptions.260 Nonetheless, for the purpose of the present discussion, 
once again, the copyright-fundamental-rights intersection was crucial. 
Accordingly, the CJEU was asked to elaborate upon the manner in 
which fundamental rights set out in the Charter were to be taken into 
account when evaluating the scope of exclusive rights, exceptions, and 
limitations.261 
The AG examined the potential clash between Article 13 of the 
Charter—the freedom of the arts—and the exclusive right of 
reproduction of the producers and stated that such conflict is somewhat 
paradoxical.262 The main objective of copyright and related rights is to 
promote the development of the arts by ensuring that artists receive 
revenue from their work so that they are not dependent on patrons and 
are free to pursue their creative activity.263 This freedom is not restricted 
by the requirement of obtaining a license for sampling, which is seen as 
a normal market constraint.264 An important warning message from the 
AG was that, while the protection granted to record producers may 
seem excessive as it is equal to that of authors, it is not for the CJEU to 
make this judgment.265 
It cannot be ruled out that, in the future, the EU legislature may 
introduce a specific exception addressing sampling situations such as the 
one at stake in Pelham, but that falls within the competencies of the 
legislature, not of the CJEU. In the meantime, the role of fundamental 
rights in the discourse of copyright law is that of ultima ratio—that the 
CJEU cannot depart “from the wording of the relevant copyright 
provisions except in  cases of gross violation[s] of the essence of a 
fundamental right.”266 In the present discourse on the freedom of the 
arts, it was the AG’s opinion that such violations had not occurred. 
Following his opinion, academics have called for a more flexible 
interpretation of the relevant copyright provisions in light of the 
fundamental rights involved, and, as such, the AG’s opinion has been 
viewed as too restrictive.267 
The facts of the three cases differ and some academics, as well as 
the Advocate General Szpunar himself, have agreed that only the 
Pelham case was indeed a true copyright case, while the other two 
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pertained to military reports and the issue of a politician distancing 
himself from his own previous statements.268 Nonetheless, there is a 
thread that ties the three cases together: they all analyzed the issue of 
where to locate the balancing exercise. The CJEU faced the question 
whether the EU copyright system itself can accommodate the tension 
between various fundamental rights. Particularly, the court had to 
evaluate whether, apart from the mechanisms already enshrined in the 
InfoSoc Directive, fundamental rights can be an autonomous external 
ground for balancing and, in these cases, limiting copyright.269 
Through these judgments, the CJEU has once more reaffirmed 
that the list of copyright exceptions in the EU is a closed one.270 
Furthermore, the InfoSoc Directive safeguards a fair balance between 
the interests of rightsholders, users, and the public.271 Another common 
holding is that exceptions and limitations are specifically aimed at 
favoring fundamental rights, such as, the freedom of expression and the 
freedom of the press, whereby a fair balance has to be stuck through the 
internal mechanisms of the InfoSoc Directive.272 The CJEU, following 
the AG’s tone, has been very clear in its stance that allowing Member 
States to deviate from the closed list of exceptions provided in the 
InfoSoc Directive would conflict with the legislative powers of the EU. 
In other words, expanding the exhaustive list of exceptions is not a task 
for the court. Nonetheless, the CJEU has also underscored that should 
a Member State decide to introduce any of the optional exceptions in 
Article 5, both the transposition as well as the interpretation of that 
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exception must take place in full adherence to the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Charter.273 
D. Fundamental Rights as an Autonomous External Ground for 
Balancing? 
The outcome of these CJEU cases is not entirely surprising.274 The 
CJEU could not have gone beyond what the copyright provisions 
expressly state. This is to be differentiated from the field of 
intermediaries’ liability—an area of the acquis that, until the recent EU 
copyright reform, was only roughly sketched in legislation.275 In that 
respect, one gets the feeling that when secondary legislation does not 
deal directly with the issue, as in the intermediaries’ liability cases, the 
court resorts to the Charter’s proportionality assessment to maintain the 
fair balance of interests.276 On the contrary, whenever the relevant 
secondary legislation deals explicitly with a certain issue, as in the 
exceptions and limitations cases, the assessment must remain within the 
internal balancing field. In these circumstances, the court is strongly 
driven by the fact that certain features of copyright law have indeed been 
harmonized in the InfoSoc Directive. 
In addition, when focusing on the internal balancing mechanism, 
the court has affirmed that many features of the InfoSoc Directive reflect 
the copyright-fundamental-rights equilibrium. Indeed, it is not a novel 
idea that, nowadays, secondary legislation actually sets fundamental right 
standards—something that Professor Muir refers to as the “functional” 
power to regulate fundamental rights.277 In fact, the EU institutions have 
regularly reflected fundamental rights standards in the preambles of the 
directives.278 The EU Commission has even committed itself to pay 
closer attention to the fundamental rights landscape as part of the 
legislative process itself.279 What is not that clear, however, is whether 
the provisions of the InfoSoc Directive sufficiently reflect the 
fundamental rights standards. 
Although the CJEU has proclaimed that the permitted uses in 
Article 5 are not to be considered mere exceptions, but as positive users’ 
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rights280 and must be interpreted by fully adhering to the fundamental 
rights of the Charter,281 the overall picture still bears some serious 
shortcomings. In particular, doubts still exist as to whether the closed 
list of exceptions and limitations legitimately caters to all possible 
fundamental rights conflicts, even though fundamental rights concerns 
fuel some of these permitted uses.282 In other words, allowing a 
politician—on the basis of a copyright claim—to prevent the circulation 
of material that is in the interest of the general public or permitting a 
Member State to enforce a fundamental right against individuals seems 
rather counterintuitive. 
In 2018, Professor Griffiths suggested that, when the situation at 
stake is not covered by the exceptions and limitations, one can go 
straight to the Charter.283 Additionally, the enhanced status of the 
Charter has shifted the balance of power from the legislature to the 
judiciary.284 Despite this newfound ability to resort to external balancing, 
the three 2019 CJEU judgments have entirely shut the door to such 
balancing of copyrights with fundamental rights. 
 
 
V. FINAL REMARKS: ARE THE UNITED STATES AND THE EU 
MOVING IN SYNC? 
This paper explored the approaches taken by U.S. and EU courts 
in striking a balance between copyright and fundamental rights. This 
final part assesses when it is that the two jurisdictions dance in harmony 
and when instead they swirl away from one another. 
So far, the essence of internal and external balancing has been 
analyzed. Within copyright law, this occurs through internal 
mechanisms capable of accommodating the use of copyrighted material 
by users who are not rightsholders, including uses grounded on 
fundamental values, such as, free speech in the United States or the 
fundamental rights protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in the EU. This internal balancing has a double nature: it can be 
mechanical—namely, through the permitted uses and the idea-
                                                           
280 See Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
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/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN. 
281 See Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
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expression dichotomy—or substantive, resting upon the premise that 
both copyright and free speech share the same goal.285 In light of society’s 
broad interest in having public access to the fruits of authors’ efforts, 
copyright and human rights are deemed to point to the same 
fundamental equilibrium.286 While the mechanical internal balancing 
tools are common to all copyright systems, the substantive internal 
balancing mechanisms are typical of the United States.287 When these 
internal balancing mechanisms are no longer apt to internalize conflicts 
deriving from fundamental rights, a real conflict between copyright and 
human rights manifests and, in principle, calls for a balancing exercise 
to take place outside the copyright realm in both jurisdictions.288 
The paper then moved from the theory to practice and traced the 
case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, the most influential U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, and that of the CJEU, in pursuit of ascertaining how the 
judiciary in each jurisdiction implements the above mechanisms. The 
cases demonstrate that even though, in theory, the same general setting 
is in place, in practice, the approaches followed in the United States and 
the EU differ on several elements. 
First, when copyright and human rights clash, the United States 
places a stricter reliance on the internal safeguards, while the EU turns 
to the Charter—an external safeguard—as the main tool to relieve the 
tension. Second, regarding the substance of the internal safeguards, 
while it is true that the idea-expression dichotomy is equally respected 
in the EU and the United States, strong differences clearly surface when 
it comes to the second internal safeguard—the permitted uses. While in 
the EU, a closed catalogue of permitted uses applies, in the United 
States, the fair use doctrine plays that respective role.289 At this point, the 
two jurisdictions swirl away from each other but still gently hold hands. 
Third, while the CJEU tends to balance the interests of copyright 
holders against a range of diverse fundamental rights protected under 
the EU Charter, U.S. courts only refer to the right to free speech as 
enshrined in the First Amendment. 
The reason for this divergence between United States and EU case 
law is multifold. Starting with the difference in emphasis as to internal 
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or external safeguards, the incongruence can be traced back to the 
jurisdictions’ differing approaches towards the conflict between 
copyright and human rights. In the first wave of case law on 
intermediaries’ liability,290 the CJEU expressly recognized the existence 
of a conflict between copyright and other fundamental rights and 
resorted to a proportionality assessment to solve it. Conversely, U.S. 
courts tended—and still tend—to neglect the presence of a conflict in the 
first place and eventually rely on the internal safeguards to resolve the 
dispute.291 In other words, while in the United States the conflict is 
“internalized,” in the EU, at least in the category of intermediaries’ 
liability, it has been addressed externally. 
This, in turn, mirrors the different roots of copyright law in civil 
and common law jurisdictions. In the United States, copyright protects 
private interests with the ultimate goal of fostering progress, but it does 
not have the status of a fundamental right. On the contrary, in the EU, 
copyright is afforded such status. Therefore, even though the EU 
legislature may try to take fundamental rights into account as part of the 
legislative process, fundamental values cannot be adequately crafted ex 
ante in a way that equally respects values such as freedom of expression 
but also data protection, right to privacy, the freedom to conduct 
business, and intellectual property rights. Consequently, like the cases 
on intermediaries’ liability demonstrate,292 these values ought to be 
weighed against each other any time a possible conflict arises—that is, on 
a case-by-case basis. 
Moving to the difference in the use of internal balancing 
instruments—namely, permitted uses—a closed list of exceptions leads to 
an approach completely different from that under a general and open 
standard like fair use, which, due to its flexibility, accommodates new 
circumstances arising from societal and technological developments. As 
a result, fair use is deemed to keep the mechanism of resolving conflicts 
with the copyright system up to date. The same, however, cannot be said 
of Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive, which in itself “does not constitute 
full harmonisation of the scope of the exceptions and limitations which 
it contains.”293 Moreover, over the years, apart from some outlier cases,294 
                                                           
290 See supra Section IV.B. 
291 See Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and 
Breaking-Up, 43 IDEA 233, 235–36 (2003). 
292 See supra Section IV.B. 
293 Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck, para. 27 (July 29, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex
=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3459469; Case C‑469/17, 
Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para. 42 (July 29, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216545&pageIndex
=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3459825. 
294 See generally Christophe Geiger et al., Limitations and Exceptions as Key Elements 
of the Legal Framework for Copyright in the European Union—Opinion of the 
European Copyright Society on the Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-201/13 Deckmyn, 
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we have witnessed a growing tightening of the system of European 
exceptions as a result of the increasing importance of economic rights.295 
This has led a majority of cases to interpret the exhaustive list of 
exceptions provided by EU law in a manner incompatible with the 
changing technological times, which, in turn, has moved the resolution 
of conflicts related to intermediaries’ liability outside the copyright 
system.296 
It should also be noted that, as the balancing occurs through 
different tools—the proportionality test in the EU and internal 
safeguards in the United States—the steps followed do not coincide. 
While both the proportionality test and the fair use doctrine are 
particularly fact-sensitive, the elements of the former are much more 
connected to one another than the four factors of fair use. As far as the 
proportionality test is concerned, the legitimate purpose of the 
proposed measure, assessed in light of the pursued objective, coupled 
with the requirement of establishing necessity in the given 
circumstances, are the first three elements, which seem to flow naturally 
and logically to eventually culminate in the final step—the actual 
balancing of the benefits gained by the proposed measure and the harm 
caused to the fundamental right. As a result, balancing takes place only 
as part of the last step of the proportionality test. On the other hand, the 
four factors of the fair use doctrine are assessed separately, and the 
eventual balancing occurs among all of them together. Moreover, 
additional factors can be considered. Depending on the circumstances, 
the market, and the use in question, some of the four factors would 
weigh more than the others, which is certainly not the case with the 
proportionality test where none of the four steps takes precedence. 
The minuet between U.S. and EU jurisprudence on the 
intersection between copyright and human rights does not end with the 
partners separated from one another. As already pointed out, the 
difference in the approaches lies more in the formal recognition of a 
conflict between copyright and human rights than in the adoption of a 
balancing practice between copyright and other interests. However 
framed, in both jurisdictions, a balancing of copyright protection against 
values protected by fundamental rights does seem to be—even when 
implied—a necessary step in the decision-making process.  
                                                           
46 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 93 (2015) (welcoming the CJEU’s 
departure from the doctrine of strict interpretation of exceptions and limitations in cases 
in which fundamental rights such as freedom of expression are involved). 
295 COPYRIGHT RECONSTRUCTED: RETHINKING COPYRIGHT’S ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN A 
TIME OF HIGHLY DYNAMIC TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE (P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz ed., 2018). 
296 See Georgios I. Zekos, Copyrights and Trademarks in Cyberspace: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 313, 342–44 (2016) (discussing the 
shortcomings of the EU exceptions regarding recent technological developments). 
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Regardless of the conceptualization of the balancing performed by 
U.S. and EU courts as internal or external—and regardless of the 
instruments entailed—in both cases, a balancing does take place 
whenever a conflict between different interests occurs. Thus, in both 
jurisdictions, the judiciary employs a certain degree of flexibility. While 
this may not be new in the United States—as the fair use doctrine has 
often enabled copyright to adjust to social and technological 
developments297—it is indeed novel in the EU, where the call for a more 
flexible copyright—particularly, in relation to the exception and 
limitation regimes—has been made for years.298 In a way, then, the 
proportionality test as employed by the CJEU, as well as by many 
national courts, provides a degree of flexibility that the fair use doctrine 
has always provided in the United States.299 Interestingly, this has also 
been the case in several European Member States where courts, in 
dealing with artistic expression, have come to the point of introducing a 
sort of “fair use” approach through the application of fundamental rights 
as external limitations to copyright law.300 
More recently, however, the CJEU has hinted at a slight change of 
direction in three cases where a clash between copyright and 
fundamental rights—namely, freedom of information,301 freedom of the 
press,302 and artistic freedom303—appeared before the court. In all of 
them, the court has preferred to rely on permitted uses instead of 
recurring to external balancing. In the court’s opinion, the three 
fundamental rights in question “are not capable of justifying, beyond the 
exceptions and limitations . . . a derogation from the author’s exclusive 
rights of reproduction and of communication to the public.”304 
This strong assertion may suggest that, in the context of exceptions 
and limitations, the CJEU “has closed the door on the application of 
                                                           
297 Sag, supra note 28. 
298 P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of 
Flexibilities, SSRN ELECTRONIC J. (Nov. 15, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1959554 [https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1959554]. 
299 Christophe Geiger, “Fair Use” Through Fundamental Rights: When Freedom of 
Artistic Expression Allows Creative Appropriations and Opens up Statutory Copyright 
Limitations, in COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW (Wee Loon ed., 2019) (analyzing French and German cases in which 
copyright was juxtaposed with freedom of artistic expression). 
300 Id. 
301 Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (July 
29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216545
&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3463672. 
302 Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Beck (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216543&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3465797. 
303 Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter (July 29, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216552&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3466043. 
304 Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH, para. 96(2) (emphasis added). 
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fundamental rights as an external limitation to copyright.”305 It must, 
nonetheless, be highlighted that when the court actually strikes the 
balance between exclusive rights of rightsholders and exceptions and 
limitations safeguarding the interests of users, it states that provisions 
must be interpreted in full adherence to the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Charter.306 In a way, the CJEU seems to bring inside 
copyright the balancing practice that had so far—at least in the 
intermediaries’ liability line of cases—taken place outside of it.  
This twist brings our two dancers, the United States and the EU, 
closer. The court’s strong emphasis on the fact that exceptions and 
limitations actually confer rights on the users307 by bringing the balancing 
exercise within the parameters of the copyright system echoes the 
approach that U.S. courts have followed from Eldred onward. Both 
jurisdictions now stand on the same ground and seem to confirm the 
self-sufficiency of the copyright framework in handling the equilibrium. 
It remains to be seen whether the mechanics of the proportionality test 
and the balancing exercise entailed will result in further divergences 
between the two jurisdictions or whether they will eventually mutually 
influence each other. In their next dance, will the EU and the United 
States dance off to their own music or will they move in sync? 
                                                           
305 Tatiana Eleni Synodinou, Reflections on the CJEU’s Judgment in Spiegel Online: Is 
There a Golden Intersection Between Freedom of Expression and EU copyright Law? 




306 See Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH, para. 59; Case C-469/17, Funke Medien 
NRW GmbH, para. 76. 
307 See Case C-516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH, para. 54; Case C-469/17, Funke Medien 
NRW GmbH, para. 70. 
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